10/30 – A Rhetoric of the Multitude
Text: A Grammar of the Multitude
Presentation: Derek on Multitude
Housekeeping:
A Multitude of Multitudes (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hardt & Negri): Virno doesn’t have any telos up his sleeve, no ready-made program for the multitude-certainly not coming out “the other side.” It’s been tried before, didn’t turn out so well. Why should a “postmodern revolution” be any different? Anyone who cares for the multitude should first figure out what it is about and what could be expected from it, not derive its mode of being from some revolutionary essence. The ultimate goal of Virno’s inventive inventory is “rescuing political action from its current paralysis.” Empire is trying that too, but a straw fight won’t do — The Multitude Strikes Back… Virno may be onto something when he suggests that Post-Fordism is the communism of capital.” It doesn’t say that there is no more fights in sight, that post-Fordism brought us “communism.” Fights should be expected, but not a war that would allegedly destroy the enemy. A combat rather, meant to strengthen some forces present in capital, and join them with other forces in order to form a new communist ensemble. This is what Virno has been attempting to provide: the description of a combat, a cartography of virtualities made possible by post-Fordism, elements in contemporary life that could eventually be mobilized. The problem is not to destroy capital or Empire — destroy, they say — but bolster one’s own power. What is a body capable of? (16-17)
Konoi Topoi: The transformation with which we must come to terms can be summarized in this way: in today’s world, the “special places” of discourse and of argumentation are perishing and dissolving, while immediate visibility is being gained by the “common places,” or by generic logical-linguistic forms which establish the pattern for all forms of discourse. This means that in order to get a sense of orientation in the world and to protect ourselves from its dangers, we can not rely on those forms of thought, of reasoning, or of discourse which have their niche in one particular context or another. The clan of sports fans, the religious community, the branch of a political party, the workplace: all of these “places” obviously continue to exist, but none of them is sufficiently characterized or characterizing as to be able to offer us a wind rose, or a standard of orientation, a trustworthy compass, a unity of specific customs, of specific ways of saying/ thinking things. Everywhere, and in every situation, we speak/ think in the same way, on the basis of logical-linguistic constructs which are as fundamental as they are broadly general. An ethical-rhetorical topography is disappearing. The “common places” (these inadequate principles of the “life of the mind”) are moving to the forefront: the connection between more and less, the opposition of opposites, the relationship of reciprocity, etc. These “common places,” and these alone, are what exist in terms of offering us a standard of orientation, and thus, some sort of refuge from the direction in which the world is going. (36-37)
The General Intellect and Linguistic-Virtuositic Labor: The speaker alone — unlike the pianist, the dancer or the actor— can do without a script or a score. The speaker’s virtuosity is twofold: not only does it not produce an end product which is distinguishable from performance, but it does not even leave behind an end product which could be actualized by means of performance. In fact, the act of parole makes use only of the potentiality of language, or better yet, of the generic faculty of language: not of a pre-established text in detail. The virtuosity of the speaker is the prototype and apex of all other forms of virtuosity, precisely because it includes within itself the potential/act relationship, whereas ordinary or derivative virtuosity, instead, presupposes a determined act (as in Bach’s “Goldberg” Variations, let us say), which can be relived over and over again. But I will return to this point later. It is enough to say, for now, that contemporary production becomes “virtuosic” (and thus political) precisely because it includes within itself linguistic experience as such. If this is so, the matrix of post-Fordism can be found in the industrial sectors in which there is “production of communication by means of communication”; hence, in the culture industry. (56)
Publicness Without a Public Sphere: When the fundamental abilities of the human being (thought, language, self-reflection, the capacity for learning) come to the forefront, the situation can take on a disquieting and oppressive appearance; or it can even give way to a non-public public sphere, to a non-governmental public sphere, far from the myths and rituals of sovereignty. My thesis, in extremely concise form, is this: if the publicness of the intellect does not yield to the realm of a public sphere, of a political space in which the many can tend to common affairs, then it produces terrifying effects. A publicness without a public sphere: here is the negative side — the evil, if you wish — of the experience of the multitude. (40)
Non-Servile Virtuosity: How is non-servile virtuosity possible? How do we move, hypothetically, from a servile virtuosity to a “republican” virtuosity (understanding “republic of the multitude” to mean a sphere of common affairs which is no longer state-run)? How do we conceive, in principle, of political action based on the general intellect? We must tread this terrain carefully. All we can do is to point to the logical form of something that is still lacking a solid empirical experience. I am proposing two key-terms: civil disobedience and exit. (69)
The Communism of Capital: The metamorphosis of social systems in the West, during the 1980’s and 1990’s, can be synthesized in a more pertinent manner with the expression: communism of capital. This means that the capitalistic initiative orchestrates for its own benefit precisely those material and cultural conditions which would guarantee a calm version of realism for the potential communist. Think of the objectives which constitute the fulcrum of such a prospect: the abolition of that intolerable scandal, the persistence of wage labor; the extinction of the State as an industry of coercion and as a “monopoly of political decision-making”; the valorization of all that which renders the life of an individual unique. Yet, in the course of the last twenty years, an insidious and terrible interpretation of these same objectives has been put forth. First of all, the irreversible shrinking of socially necessary labor time has taken place, with an increase in labor time for those on the “inside” and the alienation of those on the “outside.” Even when squeezed by temporary workers, the entity of employed workers presents itself as “overpopulation” or as the “industrial reserve army.” Secondly, the radical crisis, or actually the desegregation, of the national States expresses itself as the miniature reproduction, like a Chinese box, of the form-of-State. Thirdly. after the fall of a “universal equivalent” capable of operating effectively, we witness a fetishistic cult of differences — except that these differences, claiming a substantial surreptitious foundation. give rise to all sorts of domineering and discriminating hierarchies.




In his book A Grammar of the Multitude (2004, Virno describes the migration of the political from the public sphere into the realms of production. Political agency moves into the realm of labor through virtuosity. For Virno, virtuosity is any activity that “finds its own fulfillment and its own purpose in itself;” specifically, it does not need an end product, the production/performance is the product. Also, virtuosity is “an activity that requires the presence of others;” it can only exist within the presence of other, not on its own. This is a post-Fordist moment, a post-Fordist multitude. This post-Fordist capitalist system develops through the performance of multiplicity that often does not produce and end product. But, this capitalist system does require a space that is public in nature. Similar to Arednt’s definition of the political/public sphere, this system’s labor runs upon observation, cooperation, communication, and so on. It seems, that similar to Bellar, Massumi, and others we have read, labor has seeped into our every facet of out lives. The state or capitalist system (one) requires the multitude (laborers/us) to perform our labor continuously. We are caught within the ongoing cycle of performance and production; we are Bill Murrey in Ground Hog Day.
This post-Fordist realm of production requires all of our capabilities and our attention. All of our capabilities, mental, physical, psychological, and so on, are put to work in this new system. Therefore, the capitalist system demands our dreams, our fears, our desires, our free time, our productive time, our brains—everything. Our status as laborer has become increasingly complex and shaky. Job security no longer exists, everyone is replaceable; knowledge and skill has become a mass, a part of the multitude. Our grammar of exploitation, labor, leisure, has changed.
How, though, does the capitalist system encourage, force laborers to continue to work in this Ground Hog day existence? It is a shared experience. It comes from the continuous interaction with others and a shared knowledge or set of capabilities. If one doubts this, one can simply look to academia (a field that attempts to appear separate from the capitalist industry). Rather than individual skills or knowledge, collaboration and collective ideas circulate. Peer editing, interdisciplinary studies, new media theory which calls for an end to one narrative and a narrative of the multitude. Or, one might look to labor itself. We still have areas in which specialized knowledge is required, but more and more, collective knowledge and performance runs the machine. It is my performance that becomes capital. And, if no one is watching, if my labor is not placed within the public realm, then it ceases to exist. My labor, my leisure is now not only mine, but everyone’s. Therefore, I, along with others, labor in my viewing of Dancing With the Stars or in my role as a teacher. If no one sees me as a legitimate teacher, if students do not view my performance as authoritative, then I am not laboring. Even my sex life becomes part of the multitude through out voyeuristic explorations and proliferation of sex tapes uploaded on the internet. And, this exploitation garners me more capital, more labor.
Yet, Virno does indicate that one can resist the system. He argues that one cannot become subversive or need to obey. Instead, one can simply place their labor/attention somewhere else. Where that might be, I am not sure. Would this mean that we either become a follower of Thoreau, or as Beller indicates, look to the avant-garde for areas of transgression? Or, should I attempt to become an individual within this mass of the multitude, to become one? How would this happen? Where would my originality come from?
Jule said this on November 20, 2008 at 11:55 pm
Paolo Virno “A Grammar of the Multitude”
In the Day One chapter “Forms of Dread and Refuge” Virno uses the example of someone observing a snow slide and feeling an inner sense of pleasing security because, as an observer, the person is confident and thankfully safe from danger. Through Virno’s examination of the relationship between dread and refuge, we can see a connection among the various disempowered groups in America’s capitalism. For example, minority groups, such as African Americans or Latinos are often lumped together with other minority groups, such as people with disabilities. In an attempt to escape the label of being the Other, one minority group will dispel the other: A poor white man might say, “I might be poor, but at least I am not a woman”; a white female might say, “I may be a woman, but at least I am not Black”; an African Americans might say “I may be Black, but at least I am not disabled”; a white man with disability/ies might say “I might be disabled, but at least I am not poor, Black, or a woman”. To be clear, here, I am not arguing the experience of being a woman, an African American, or a person with disabilities is similar. Indeed the Black, Female, and Disabled experience are distinctly layered and diversely complex. Still, the dialectic of dread/refuge can be seen here through the (mis)conceptions of dis/ableism, when compared too closely with the trinity of isms—race, class, and gender. While there is, Virno argues, a “continuous oscillation between different, sometimes diametrically opposed, strategies of reassurance” (35), disability has never been a monolithic grouping, and because the enormous diversity of disability differs from any other “minority” groups, experiences of cultural devaluation and socially imposed restrictions are often more varied and thus distinct from than the historical experience of these other groups, despite our tendency to link them together. Virno’s theory on dread and refuge can be seen through this example in that disempowered groups find refuge within themselves by defining precisely why they are not the dreaded Other.
Pulling from Heidigger’s theory on fear and anguish, Virno argues “Fear situates itself inside the community, inside its forms of life and communication . Anguish, on the other hand, makes its appearance when it distances itself from the community to which it belongs, from its shared habits, from its well known ‘linguistic games,’ and then penetrates into the vast world” (32). According to Virno, fear is a public feeling while anguish is the feeling when one is ostracized by the public. Connecting Virno’s theory on fear/anguish to the social model of disability, one could argue abled bodies harbor the socially acceptable and quite public feeling of fear when faced with the very real possibility of becoming disabled. Simultaneously, our ableist society (incorrectly) assumes that people with disabilities are consumed with anguish over their existence. In assuming this, abled bodies distance themselves from the disabled community— from the community’s habits and patterns—while simultaneously burying themselves in the ableist society, thereby creating the very situation Virno argues must occur for anguish to exist. In this way, abled bodies both 1) fear the disabled body and 2) assume all disabled bodies live in anguish over their (dis)abled existence. According to Virno, “The permanent mutability of the forms of life, and the training needed for confronting the unchecked uncertainty of life, lead us to a direct and continuous relation with the world as such, with the imprecise context of our existence” (33).
Crystal Starkey said this on November 21, 2008 at 2:48 pm
My question begins with Virno’s use of Bianciardi’s metaphor on page 57 that tertiary workers are Vasoline. He starts with defining the primary workers (farmers who produce something from nothing) and secondary workers (factory workers who transform one thing from another); and then he categorizes journalists, priests and politics as tertiary (they are “neither instruments of production, nor drive belts of transmission”) So he measures their “excellence” on how quickly they get to the top and how long they stay there. However, journalists do produce something from scratch ie a journalist takes some facts and mold these facts into a product that is sold and they also transform one thing from another basic facts can be transformed into a full story, so doesn’t the journalist need to be removed from the Vasoline metaphor?
My second question deals with Heidegger’s presumption that idle talk was a poor experience and should be deprecated which was refuted by Virno who said idle talk directly concerns labor and social production. Virno noted the post-Fordism brought language to the workplace. My question is probably directed at Dr. Pruchnic, Why did this change take place? Was it a movement to bring back the workers lost during this movement? Was language now viewed as a benefit to the labor market?
Cindy said this on November 23, 2008 at 9:28 pm
Although I’m interested in Virno’s suppositions concerning innovation, especially as they are tied to the very bio-linguistic capacities of the human animal, it remains a little uncertain as to where the exodus leaves the multitude. This is to say, that I’m particularly interested in where the multitude is left when this plurality actually decides to leave: Quite simply, where does this collective of individuals move afterwards; after the current, perhaps oppressive, forces of the institution or state? Surely, in Virno’s terms, the very drives or capacities that differentiate humans from non-human animals predicate the development of a different (and one can assume Political) system. Unfortunately, it seems that second state, if one can call it that, will be little different than the first. You might be able to change the grammar, or exchange one type of grammar for another, because without, you are essentially, in Virno’s very human terms, a non-human animal, but I’m having difficulty reading how this changes anything more than just temporarily.
Is it that Virno is calling for a complete, continual, and frequent uprooting? What about the digital or contemporary technological practices? Though Virno hardly seems interested in technologies, as he prefers to focus on linguistic conditions, one can see that certain technologies might exert an incredibly influence on the type of movement that Virno describes. Basically, I would just like to hear some conjectures to this end.
jargoncomputer said this on November 24, 2008 at 12:26 am
I thought we were just supposed to come up with two questions for class, so my post is going to look a bit weak in comparison. My misunderstanding … I blame the kid.
Questions: A Grammar of the Multitude
1.) What is the New Media aspect to Virno’s argument? Is it in Virno’s discussion of “idle talk” and “curiosity,” which could be linked to the explosion, through Internet and communications technology of the enhanced performativity of “creative free time?” And if so …
2.) If the post- Fordist mode of production allows for the performativity of idle talk, curiosity and virtuosity, could this be interpreted as a jump to a culture of production based more on orality?
Conor Shaw-Draves said this on November 24, 2008 at 1:42 am
I shared CS-D’s understanding, and I also blame the kid.
1) If the multitude is defined (in part) by contingency and opportunism (see Virno 86), is there a way to effectively mobilize it for political or social action? That is, how does one use the multitude?
2) As a kind of general question about the ontology of the multitude: Is the multitude best understood as an objective category or a subjective state-of-being? In Heideggerian terms, how do we describe the multitude’s being-in-the-world? Is it at-hand or is it Dasein? (Or, to riff on the Killers’ latest hit, “Are we multitude or are we Dasein?”)
3) And, a more broadly ontological and philosophical follow-up to that: Is the subjective the same as the agentive? Or, if the multitude is a subject (or a subjectivity) is it also an agent? Or vice-versa?
mike said this on November 27, 2008 at 6:43 am
I second or third the understanding that questions were to be posted from last week — but I will not partake in blaming the kid!
1.) Virno’s section on the emotional tonalities of the multitude is intriguing because he lists the requirements of workers today, but states that these qualities such as adaptation and mobility “are the result of a socialization that has its center of gravity outside of the workplace” (85). How can we examine social talents in relation to labor that originate in the “extra-curricular” arena of experience?
2.) Virno’s “concise thesis” on p. 40 states, “if the publicness of the intellect does not yield to the realm of a public sphere, of a political space in which the many can tend to common affairs, then it produces terrifying effects.” Freud’s study of people who are mentally ill and the experience of a seance are cited as examples of a publicness without a public sphere – where thoughts become externalized, fearful, oppressive, and nullify the self. But here is where I would like clarification because I’m not quite sure if I understand Virno’s claim about personal dependence on others and labor: is the act of sharing through speaking and thinking the crucial element in subduing the person/laborer within the public sphere/political community? So, if a person does not share publicly (via communication and linguistic, cognitive capacities) then he/she is a threat to the multitude?
Wendy Duprey said this on December 1, 2008 at 4:37 am